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The Federal Dimension
of Canadian Economic Nationalism

Donald V. Smiley*

Economic nationalism is the subordination of economic structures
and processes to political considerations. More specifically,
economic nationalism includes: (i) actions by governments, whether
of sovereign states or otherwise, to preserve and/or enhance their
powers in respect to the production, distribution and exchange of
goods and services against the influence of other governments and of
non-national individuals and business groups. (ii) actions by governments to effect or sustain material distributions favouring national
as against non-national individuals or groups. (iii) actions by governments to effect or sustain particular distributions of material
benefits and burdens among their own nationals as these distributions
are believed to be necessary to the integrity and survival of the
political community. (iv) actions by governments to facilitate the
movement of goods and people within national boundaries and to
impede movement across such boundaries. (v) the sentiments and the
ideological and other justifications supporting the governmental
policies outlined above.
Within the framework of federalism, economic nationalism is
always at least a potential focus for conflict between the central and
regional governments. The most dramatic of such clashes in Canadian history between federal and provincial economic nationalisms
occurred in respect to the chartering of railways by the Manitoba
government in the 1880s and the Alberta attempts to control monetary institutions in the latter half of the 1930s. The focus of this paper
is the emergent conflict between federal and provincial economic
policies which has followed the piecemeal disintegration of what is
designed as the "new national policy" formulated by the government
of Canada during and just at the end of the Second World War and
implemented during the next decade.
1. The Old and the New National Policies
The objectives of what the late Vernon Fowke called the "old
*Donald V. Smiley, Professor of Political Economy, University of Toronto.
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national policy"'-the trilogy of tariffs and government support for
immigration and the building of east-west railways - had in the main
been completed by the beginning of the First World War. The 1920s
saw Ottawa pursuing few important national goals but rather undertaking "a number of comparatively minor chores so that the economy
might operate satisfactorily within its existing limits. "2 According to
Fowke's analysis, Confederation and the establishment of political
nationhood were integral parts of the fulfilment of the earlier decisions of the business interests of the St. Lawrence to pursue a policy
confined to the British North American colonies after they had been
precluded from furthering their objectives within either continental or
imperial frameworks by actions of the American and British governments. "The federal government which was established by the BNA
Act was the creature of the national policy and its most prominent
instrument. After 1867 the further elaboration and pursuit of the
national policy became the leading, if not the sole, objective of the
national government. "3 During the interwar years sucessive federal
governments were remarkably insensitive to the consequences of
Canada having fulfilled the former national policy without having
been committed to a new set of economic goals. However, there was
in those years, according to Fowke, a groping toward new national
directions which he discussed under three headings: (1) most crucially, federal responsibility for social and economic conditions as
manifested by the Old Age Pension Act of the 1927 and the abortive
Bennett New Deal of the mid-1930s, (2) effective monetary management signalled by the establishment of the Bank of Canada, (3)
new policies for agriculture devoted not as were the previous ones
toward agricultural expansion but rather toward dealing with an
industry which relative to the rest of the economy was growing little if
at all and shielding this industry from the vagaries of the price system.
With the benefit of two decades more of hindsignt than had
Fowke, it seems reasonable to argue that he exaggerated the interwar
period in the development of new national economic policies and
underestimated the significance of federal initiatives during and
immediately at the end of the Second World War. 4 From the earliest
1. "The National Policy-Old and New" (1952), 18 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sc. 271.
2. Ibid., at 279.
3. Ibid., at 276.
4. D. V. Smiley, ConstitutionalAdaptation and CanadianFederalismsince 1945,
Documents of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Queen's
Printer, Ottawa, 1970) Chapter II.
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days of the War onward elected and appointed officials of both
federal and provincial governments devoted considerable attention
toward planning for postwar domestic reconstruction and in 1944 and
1945 these efforts were intensified. In Ottawa a sophisticated and
interventionist civil service had been brought into existence and by
the end of hostilities three new Departments concerned with
economic and social matters established - Reconstruction, National
Health and Welfare and Veterans' Affairs. During the War unemployment insurance had been brought under exclusive federal jurisdiction through constitutional amendment, a scheme of family allowances instituted and federal action taken in respect to housing and
vocational training. These and other Dominion initiatives on social
and economic development were joined with policies enumerated by
the federal government in the White Paper on Employment and
Income of April, 19455 and the "Green Book" proposals placed
before the Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction convened in August of that year. 6 Taken together, these manifestations
of federal purpose and their implementation in the decade after the
War are worthy of being regarded as a new national policy replacing
the former national objectives of the nineteenth century whose fulfilment had been symbolized by the transfer to the Prairie provinces
of the jurisdiction over their natural resources in 1930.
The new national policy had three essential elements (1) national leadership in managing the economy, particularly through the
instrument of fiscal policies directed toward full employment and
price stability, (2) national leadership in establishing and sustaining a
Canadian welfare state, (3) Canadian policies devoted to international reconstruction, to lowering barriers to international trade and
to the establishment of stability in the international monetary order.
The Keynesian solution which saw the chief economic role of national governments as the management of the aggregate levels of
demand through generalized fiscal and monetary policies had an
immediate attraction for federal policy-makers at the end of the
Second World War. As T. N. Brewis has pointed out, one of the chief
attractions of the Keynesean theory "was its association with an

5. Canada, Department of Reconstruction, Employment and Income with Special
Reference to the Initial Period of Reconstruction (King's Printer, Ottawa, 1945).
6. Dominion-ProvincialConference (1945), DominionandProvincialSubmissions

and Plenary Conference Sessions (King's Printer, Ottawa, 1946). For the original
Dominion proposals see pp. 55-119.
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analytical formula which lent itself to ready administration.' 7Unlike
socialism, this theory did not call for the extension of either public
ownership or precise public controls over particular elements of the
national economy. Perhaps just as importantly, the Keynesian solution -

as received in Canada -

proposed an effective role for the

national government in economic management without the constitutional complications of the federal division of legislative powers
which had appeared so crucial an obstruction to national economic
policies in the previous decade. 8
The three essential elements of the new national policy national leadership in economic management through generalized
fiscal and monetary policies, the welfare state and the reconstruction
of the international economic order on liberal lines - appeared in the
perspective of federal policy-makers in the mid-1940s to be closely
related. So far as the first two were concerned, the Keynesian
analysis had been formulated in the face of the Great Depression and
its thrust was toward asserting the responsibilities of the national
government for making up the deficiences of aggregate demand
believed chronic in mature capitalist economies. On this basis, Ottawa officialdom anticipated that when the country adjusted itself to
peace-time circumstances there would be a continuing need for the
national government to ensure adequately high levels of aggregate
demand if full employment was to be sustained, and public spending
on income maintenance of a magnitude never before seriously considered in Canada was a cruicial instrument for meeting this responsibility. 9 The close connection between governmental measures of
income support and full employment objectives continued in the
post-war years and Fowke wrote astringently in his 1952 article "At
times within the past ten years it has been a question whether all
peace-time national policy might not be subsumed under the head of
7. "Employment Policy", in T. N. Brewis, H. E. English, A. Scott and P. Jewett,
Canadian Economic Policy (Macmillan of Canada, Toronto, 1961) 150-151.

8. With respect to the comprehensive proposals in relation to health services the
Honourable Brooke Claxton, Minister of Health and Welfare and a distinguished
constitutional lawyer, said, "It is believed that none of these proposals involves any
change in the constitutional jurisdiction of federal or provincial governments under
the British North America Act." Dominion-ProvincialConference, op. cit., at 89.
For a subsequent discussion of how Ottawa found it possible to extend its power by
fiscal means see F. R. Scott's Presidential Address to the Royal Society of Canada in
1961 "Our Changing Constitution", reprinted in W. R. Lederman (ed.), The Courts
and the CanadianConstitution (Carleton Library, No 16; McClelland and Stewart,
Toronto, 1964) 19-34.
9. See Dominion-ProvincialConference on Reconstruction, op. cit., at 85.
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full employment policy. When baby bonuses and agricultural price
support legislation are in danger of being regarded as mere instruments for the maintenance of full employment, it is possible to
suggest at least a temporary distortion of the national perspective." 10
As the welfare state and full employment objectives of national
policy were seen by Ottawa as being closely related, so it was
asserted that these domestic goals might be effectively pursued only
within the framework of a liberal international order. Canadian
international economic policies at the end of the War and afterward
were devoted to cooperation with the United States in the reconversion of the economy to peace-time conditions, the reconstruction of
Europe and the establishment of a multilateral trading and monetary
order." The White Paper on Employment and Income said with
respect to trade, "The Government is looking to an expansion of total
world trade within which Canada as well as other countries can
increase their exports. The expansion of Canadian exports will be one
phase of an expanded Canadian economy which will require for its
use greatly increased imports. The expansion of exports is not looked
upon as a means by which unemployment is to be transferred from
this to other countries, not is the contraction of Canadian imports any
2
part of the Government's employment policy."'
The new formulations did not address themselves directly to the
complications of making economic policy occasioned by the federal
division of legislative powers or to the incidence of the new national
policy on particular provinces or regions of Canada. In respect to this
latter consideration Harold Innis wrote in 1943 "Each region has its
conditions of equilibrium in relation to the rest of Canada and to the
rest of the world, particularly in relation to Great Britain and the
United States. Manipulation of a single instrument such as monetary
policy implies a highly elaborate system to determine how far transfers between provinces or regions are necessary. Otherwise full
employment will become a racket on the part of the central provinces
for getting and keeping what they have." 1 3 Nothing was further from
10. Op. cit., at 285.
11. For a valuable collection of documents on Canadian policies in international
economic relations in the early post-war period see R. A. MacKay (ed.), Canadian
Foreign Policy 1945-1954, Selected Speeches and Documents (Carleton Library,
No. 51; McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1971) Section III.
12. Op. cit., at 26.
13. "Dencentralization and Democracy" in H. A. Innis, Essays in Canadian
Economic History (M. Q. Innis ed., University of Toronto Press, 1956) 371.
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the attention of those who formulated the White Paper and Green
Book proposals than the kind of considerations Innis had pointed out.
Further, the new national policy precluded the federal government
from attempting to narrow interprovincial disparities through fiscal
transfers to the provinces as had been recommended by the RowellSirois Commission. The Keynesian imperatives as interpreted by
Ottawa at the end of the War and afterward required that through
agreement with the provinces the federal authorities would have
exclusive access to the fields of individual and corporate income
taxes. To secure such agreement, it was necessary to fix the levels of
compensation to the provinces for giving up those tax fields not in
terms of revenue equalization or fiscal need but rather according to
the inducements necessary to secure the compliance of Ontario and
Quebec. Similar influences worked against interprovincial equalization in respect to social security and health to the extent that such
measures were embodied in conditional grant arrangements. The
levels and conditions of public support had to be geared not primarily
toward achieving interprovincial equality in the range and standard of
aided services but to what inducements those provinces least eager to
cooperate required to secure their participation.
Despite the failure of the governments of Ontario and Quebec to
agree to the comprehensive federal plan put before the Dominion Provincial Conference on Reconstruction in 1945, the main body of
the new national policy was implemented in a piecemeal way during
the next decade.
2. The Passing of the New National Policy
The story of Canadian federalism from the late 1950s onward is
largely that of the weakening of the new national policy and the
growing strength of the provinces in social and economic matters. It
is tempting to trace the development from the coming to power of the
Diefenbaker government in June, 1957. According to John Meisel's
analysis of the 1957 election, "A party long in power (and therefore,
increasingly tempted by delusions of infallibility) apparently comes
to think more and more exclusively in national terms, particularly if
most of the speculation and planning is done not by the party as such
but by Ottawa- based and Ottawa-minded civil servants.' '14 Meisel's
14. "The Formulation of Liberal and Conservative Programmes in the 1957 General
Election" (1960), 26 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sc. 273.
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account describes how the Liberals succumbed to this weakness and

how John Diefenbaker and his followers were able to exploit the
cumulation of regional grievances which had developed without at
the same time committing the country to a new and coherent set of
national objectives. But it also seems reasonable to attribute the
Liberal defeat in large part to the way federal policy-makers had
continued to view the economy in terms of the formulations of the
new national policy. Maurice Lamontagne in his analysis of postwar
economic policy in Canada delivered to the Study Conference on
National Goals convened by the federal Liberal party in 1960 said
this:
Stagnation, inflation and unemployment have a very important
regional and industrial incidence, especially in Canada. Certain
regions or industries grow rapidly while others are depressed.
Certain industries may enjoy rising prices while others, at the
same time, suffer from relatively low prices. Some industries or
regions may experience heavy unemployment while others suffer from a scarcity of labour. Our national aggregates, such as
the gross national product, the cost of living index and the
national percentage of unemployment, are frequently the result
of conflicting tendencies prevailing in different industries and
different regions. It is always unrealistic and dangerous to
interpret these national aggregates without taking their regional
and industrial components into account. It is even more dangerous to attempt to solve such economic problems as unemployment as if they had the same causes and intensity throughout the
country and as if they could be effectively met by the same
policies in all industries and all regions. 15
Lamontagne's evaluation was significant not only because of his
influence then and later on the policies of his party but because as
recently as 1954 he had published a book-length rationale of the new
national policy in Keynesian terms, by a very wide margin the most
16
coherent analysis of this policy that was ever made.
The impact on Canadian federalism of the piecemeal disintegration of the new national policy can perhaps best be analyzed in terms
of the challenges by the provinces to the dominance of the federal
government in respect to each of the essential elements of this policy
- economic management, the welfare state and international
economic relations.
A. Economic Management
Apart perhaps from price stability where in comparison with other
15. Growth, Price Stability and the Problem of Unemployment (mimeo) 5.

16. Le FHdrralisme Canadien (Les Presses Universitaires Laval, Quebec, 1954).
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western nations the Canadian record is favourable, the performance
of the Canadian economy since the late 1950s has been unsatisfactory
in terms of employment, economic growth and the narrowing of
regional disparities. These failures have in a broad sense dissipated
the dominance in the federal system that Ottawa established during
the earlier years and projected the provinces into a more active role in
economic management.
The prevailing view among professional economists has been
that the inadequate performance of the Canadian economy during the
past 15 years has resulted almost entirely from inappropriate actions
by the federal government in respect to monetary, fiscal and commercial policies. 17 Robin Neill has pointed out that by the 1950s
Canadian economic thought had come to be dominated by "the soft
money Keynesian group and the continentalist free traders" and that
the formulation of Harold Innis and his followers which was essen-8
tially a defence of the old national policy had been pushed aside. '
Most of the liberal economists were at one and the same time
Keynesians and free traders, and in the early 1960s found a focus for
their discontent in James Coyne, Governor of the Bank of Canada,
who supported both tight money and restrictions on foreign investment in Canada.' 9
Whatever the merits of the liberal economists' support for
generalized fiscal and monetary policies as the primary instruments
of economic management, the Keynesian analysis did not take into
account the institutional circumstances of federalism and the new
national policy proved inadequate to Canadian needs in three ways:
First, heavy and continuing public expenditures on social services
were not as effective a counter-cyclical device as had been believed at
the end of the Second World War. Second, Ottawa demonstrated that
it did not have the ability and/or the will to retain exclusive access to
the major fields of direct taxation. Third, generalized fiscal and
monetary policies did not take into account the incidence of these
17. See particularly H. G. Johnson, The Canadian Quandary (McGraw-Hill of
Canada, Toronto, 1963) and the vigorous attack on post-war Canadian fiscal policies
by H. S. Gordon in "A Twenty-Year Perspective: Some Reflections on the
Keynesian Revolution in Canada" in S. F. Kaliski (ed.), CanadianEconomic Policy
Since the War (Canadian Trade Committee, Ottawa, 1966) 23-46.
18. A New Theory of Value: The CanadianEconomics of H. A. Innis (University of
Toronto Press, 1972) 118.
19. H. Scott Gordon, The Economists versus the Bank of Canada (Ryerson, Toronto, 1961).
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policies on particular regions, industries or other groupings or provide compensation for those who were in a relative sense so disadvantaged.
Spending for social security is a less effective counter-cyclical
instrument than was believed at the end of the Second World War. As
we have seen, the Keynesian prescription anticipated that in peacetime capitalist economies there would be a chronic deficiency of
aggregate demand. Inflation, however, later appeared to be the
chronic circumstance of such economies, although this has often
been accompanied in Canada and elsewhere by less than what
economists and policymakers have from time to time defined as full
employment. Further, many income maintenance programmes involve semi-contractual obligations which cannot in practical terms be
altered to meet short-run exigencies of fiscal policy 20 and under
Canadian circumstances social security is shared between the federal
and provincial governments.
It was a crucial element of the new national policy that the
federal government should have exclusive access to the taxation of
individual and corporate incomes so that full employment with relative price stability could be maintained through discretionary changes
in the rates of these taxes. The centralized fiscal regime which had
been established during the Second World War was effectively challenged in 1954 when Quebec began to tax individual incomes. 2 1 The
protracted dispute between the Quebec and federal governments
which resulted from this measure ended by the divorcing of tax
rentals from equalization payments to the provinces in the tax agreements of 1957-62. In the latter year the tax rental system was ended
and Ottawa began a process of abating its own tax rates on individual
and corporate incomes so that the provinces could move into these
fields. The pressures of the provinces for "tax room" in a period of
rapidly rising provincial and local expenditures caused Ottawa to
lower its rates of income taxation on several occasions between 1962
and the fall of 1966, at which latter date the federal authorities
announced their intention not to yield further. The abatement system
was ended in 1972, as well as the federal estate tax which had been an

20. Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance on Growth,
Employment and Price Stability (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1971) 3-4.
21. A. Moore, J. Perry and I. Beach, The Financing of Canadian Federation

(Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto, 1966) Chapter III.
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integral though not an essential element of federal fiscal dominance
under the new national policy.
During the mid 1960s the question arose as to what role, if any,
the provinces could or should play in designing their own independent fiscal policies as instruments of full employment, price stability
and economic growth. The answer of the federal Royal Commission
on Taxation in 1966 was clear - the only effective procedure was
federal-provincial coordination in fiscal policy of a more formalized
kind than had hitherto existed. 22 The recommendation was for "binding agreements" about taxation and expenditure and it was quite
inappropriate for the provinces to design or implement independent
fiscal policies. The government of Ontario received contrary advice
from its Committee on Taxation in 196723 and in subsequent years
has formulated its own fiscal policy around the concept of the "fullemployment budget" in the direction of mitigating the allegedly
24
contractionary effects of federal policies on the Ontario economy.
Harold Innis was characteristically prescient in understanding
that exclusive reliance on a small range of policy instruments would
disturb the equilibrium of each of the Canadian provinces and regions
in respect both to the rest of the country and the outside world. The
same might be said of the insensitivity of the generalized instruments
of fiscal and monetary policies on other equilibria of Canadian
society - of industries, occupational groupings, age groups etc. So
far as the territorial incidence of the new national policy was concerned, the disparities in large part inherited from the operation of the
old national policy were perpetuated or even exaggerated and the
Fifth Annual Report of the Economic Council of Canada published in
1968 concluded:
Differences in both the levels of economic and social well-being
and in economic opportunity among the various regions and
provinces of Canada are large, and have persisted with only
modest change for over 40 years. This persistence has been
22. Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1966)
Vol. 2, 91-105.

23. See particularly the study done for the Commission by Clarence L. Barber
whose prescriptions were in general accepted in the Commission's Report, Theory of
FiscalPolicy as Applied to a Province (Queen's Printer, Toronto, 1967) Chapter 3.

24. See the 1971 and 1972 Budget Speeches of the Treasurer of Ohtario. The 1973
Budget Speech dealt with federal policies in a more conciliatory way to the general
effect that both governments were moving in the appropriate expansionist direction
but that, so far as Ontario was concerned, provincial policies had been more effective
than federal.

The Federal Dimension of Canadian Economic Nationalism 561

remarkable; neither strong national economic growth nor the
strains and turbulences of depression and war have had lasting
effects on the basic pattern of regional disparities. There is little
reason to suppose that the historical mix of market forces and
public policy is likely to lead25 in good time to a significant
reduction in those disparities.
It remains a matter of contention whether federal fiscal and monetary
policies can be effectively tailored to the particular needs of porvinces and regions. 26 The Bank of Canada has apparently exercised
some "moral suasion" in recent years to encourage the chartered
banks to take a particularly favourable view of requests for loans in
slow-growth areas. The federal government has also pursued a policy
of decentralizing its purchasing policies and of locating an increasing
number of its headquarters and other facilities outside the OttawaHull Region. However, the possibilities of such policies seem somewhat limited.
Many professional economists have continued to emphasize the
securing of appropriate levels of aggregate demand through
generalized fiscal and monetary policies as the crucial instrument of
economic management and on this basis have been critical of more
selective economic measures taken by the federal and provincial
governments. However, even within this Keynesian perspective Ottawa has to a significant degree relinquished the dominance over both
taxation and expenditures which was established during the Second
World War and perpetuated for a decade afterward, and little progress has been made in harmonizing the fiscal policies of the two levels
of government. But despite the claims of liberal economists, the
makers of public policy and the influential public of Canada have
come to perceive effective economic management as a much more
complex matter than was projected by the new national policy in the
mid-1940s. The operative beliefs suggested that in addition to the
effective use of generalized fiscal and monetary instruments there is a
need for policies sensitive to the needs of particular regions, industries and groupings in the population. Some of the directions in these
more selective federal policies may be noted briefly: (i) in 1963 a
Department of Industry was established to give leadership and assistance to Canadian manufacturing. (ii) the Agricultural and Rural
25. Annual Report of the Economic Council of Canada (Queen's Printer, Ottawa,
1968) 141.
26. See Report of the Standing Senate Committee on NationalFinance, op. cit.,
Chapter VIII, "National Policy-Making in a Regional Country".
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Development Assistance Programme was begun in 1961 as the first
of several efforts later initiated in rural development. (iii) beginning
in 1963 tax incentives and direct federal grants were given to industry
locating in depressed areas and in 1969 the Department of Regional
Economic Expansion established to coordinate various federal assistance programmes in a vastly extended effort to narrow regional
economic disparities. (iv) the federal authorities have extended their
efforts in manpower development and from 1966 have assumed the
exclusive financial and administrative responsibility for the occupational retraining of adults. (v) the Ministry of State for Science and
Technology was established in 1971 with broad responsibilities for
relating federal responsibilities in respect to science and technology
to national objectives. (vi) in the Opportunities for Youth and Local
Initiative Programme of the early 1970s the federal government
attempted to deal with certain aspects of shortrun unemployment by
supporting group activities initiated by the unemployed.
The relatively unsatisfactory performance of the Canadian
economy from the late 1950s onward projected the provinces in
widely varying degrees into a more active role in economic management than ever before. As we have seen, the federal authorities
responded to these circumstances with measures sensitive to the
needs of particular regions, industries and other groupings. But once
federal policies moved on from the management of levels of aggregate demand to these more specific measures, the provinces almost
inevitably became more influential in economic matters than before
both because of their constitutional responsibilities and because of
their claims to greater responsiveness than Ottawa to particularized
needs and interests. To take a crucial example, to the extent that
unemployment was attributed in significant measure to structural
factors rather than almost entirely to deficiences in aggregate demand
the provinces were involved in such matters as vocational retraining,
industrial incentive programmes, the rationalization of particular
industries, etc.
Space precludes more than brief mention of the kinds of
economic policies adapted by the provinces from the late 1950s
onward. In the early part of the next decade there was some enthusiasm for provincial economic councils of representatives of agriculture, business, labour and government and several Orovinces notably Nova Scotia, Quebec and Ontario - made some attempts at
indicative economic planning. To widely varying degrees, the provinces undertook economic assistance programmes through indus-
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trial incentives. Part of the redefinition of Quebec which took place
from 1960 onward was manifested in the efforts of the province to
reshape the Quebec economy. As we shall see later, the provinces
have become much more active than before in soliciting markets and
capital outside Canada. The provinces have become vastly more
sophisticated than before in designing and implementing comprehensive policies in relation to such matters as transportation and communications and the development of natural resources.
Several interrelated factors have thus progressively weakened
the dominance of the federal government in economic matters which
was the central element of the new national policy. In response to the
failure of generalized fiscal and monetary policies to ensure effective
levels of employment and growth the provinces have taken defensive
measures to integrate and develop their own economies while demanding, as yet with little success, an institutionalized influence over
the processes of national decision in economic matters.
B. The Welfare State
Part of the thrust of the humanitarian and nationalistic sentiments
which emerged from the Second World War was the widespread
conviction that Canadians as an incidence of citizenship should have
access to minimum standards of public services.2 7 The need for
federal leadership in establishing and sustaining such standards was
taken for granted by the national government. As we have seen,
heavy and continuing spending on income maintenance was judged a
necessary element of full employment policy. These circumstances
have changed. Inflation, albeit accompanied by what are regarded as
unacceptably high levels of unemployment, appears to be a continuing problem and in practical terms social security rates cannot be
adjusted as instruments of stabilization policy. Also, it has been a
widespread if not prevailing belief that considerable differences
among provinces in respect to health, welfare and education are not
only tolerable but desirable manifestations of the cultural and other
particularisms which it has become fashionable to regard as the
28
distinguishing feature of Canadian life.
27. For the welfare state as a manifestation of nationalism see G. Myrdal, Beyond
the Welfare State (Bantam Edition, New York, 1967) Chapter 10.
28. See FinalReport of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of
Commons of Canada on the Constitution of Canada (Queen's Printer, Ottawa,

1972). The master-solution of the Report is to vest exclusive or paramount powers on
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From the mid 1960s onward Ottawa has both increased its
relative financial contributions to health, welfare and education and
relinquished some of its former powers to determine the specific
conditions under which services were provided. The contraction of
federal powers over the Canadian welfare state has admittedly been
somewhat uneven and has been accompanied by several new initiatives by the national government. The Canada Pension Plan came
into effect in 1965 in all the provinces except Quebec with the
condition that future federal legislation in respect to the Plan should
be enacted only after the consent of two-thirds of the included
provinces having at least two-thirds of the total population of the
included provinces had been secured. 29 From late 1966 onward the
federal government assumed the exclusive financial and administrative responsibility for the occupational retraining of adults. Parliament in 1968 enacted medical insurance legislation and by the end of
1970 all provinces had plans conforming to the conditions of federal
financial assistance. In the early 1970s Ottawa established the Opportunities for Youth and Local Initiative Programme.
Despite the federal initiatives mentioned above, there were from
1965 onward counteracting measures and the thrust of these and new
arrangements still in the making are in the direction of Ottawa
withdrawing its leadership in determining the specific content and
conditions of the Canadian welfare state: (i) under the Established
Programs (Interim Arrangements) Act of 1965 the provinces were
given the option of contracting-out of several established shared-cost
programmes and to receiving fiscal equivalents in terms of a combination of abatements in the federal individual income tax and cash
adjustments. Only Quebec has taken this option, although more
recently both Ontario and Alberta have indicated their desire to do so
if satisfactory levels of financial compensation can be negotiated. (ii)
in 1966 the Canada Assistance Act provided for federal contributions
of half the provincial costs of social assistance. Under the Act five
categorical public assistance programmes were replaced by one consolidated arrangement. (iii) the Technical and Vocational Training
Ottawa for economic control and the exclusive or paramount powers on the provinces
for health, welfare and education. See particularly Part V, "Social Policy" and Part
VI, "The Regulation of the Economy".
29. The negotiations surrounding the original CPP made its benefits and those of the
Quebec plan easily transferable when Canadians moved in and out of that province. It
can plausibly be argued that to maintain such transferability the CPP will be subject
to the changes the Quebec authorities make in their plan.
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Assistance Act of 1960 which provided several specific grants-in-aid
for various programmes and facilities was not renewed when its terms
expired in 1967. It was replaced by a new arrangement in which
Ottawa pays half the operating costs of post-secondary education
without the former differentiation between the financial treatment of
universities and vocational training institutions and without determining the conditions by which the latter are operated. As this is
written in June 1973, the federal government and the provinces are
engaged in intensive negotiation when conclusion will almost inevitably be a weakening of federal powers and an enhancement of those
of the provinces in respect to the Canadian welfare state.
In their Working Paper on Social Security in Canada published
in April 197330 the federal authorities suggested to the provinces a
joint strategy for rationalizing the entire complex of social security
which had developed in a piecemeal fashion in the past. The most
radical of Ottawa's proposals would allow individual provinces to
determine the levels of income guarantees and supplements in federal
income-support programmes. Such provincial discretion in transferring federal funds among such federal programmes as Old Age
Security and family allowances and to set the conditions of federal
programmes would be subject to minimum standards set by the
national government but not spelled out in the White Paper.
Intensive federal-provincial negotiations are also taking place in
respect to the financing of health services and post-secondary education. Ottawa is now committed to reimbursing the provinces for
roughly half the expenses defined as sharable which the latter incur in
respect to these services and facilities. The federal authorities have
become increasingly restive about the open-ended nature of these
arrangements in a situation where costs are increasing rapidly. The
provinces are understandably unwilling to accept prior limitations on
federal financial liabilities. In terms of recent federal proposals the
result of this bargaining is likely to be a transfer of points of federal
income tax combined with cash payments to the provinces. Apart
from fiscal transfers, federal participation will be "deconditionalized" 3' 1 and the provinces given more discretion than they
now have to expend funds on those services and facilities without
incurring financial penalties.
30. (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1973).
31. This term has been attributed to Premier Davis of Ontario, a new addition to the
grotesque and esoteric vocabulary of federal-provincial relations.
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In general terms, the federal authorities are now acting as if the
second element of the new national policy - national leadership in
establishing the Canadian welfare state - had been achieved. The
incumbent Trudeau government at least is committed to "no more
medicares", to refrain from initiating new shared-cost programmes
without some form of prior consensus among the provinces. 3 2 The
new proposal to allow the provinces to vary the limits of federal
income-support programmes is a retreat from previous federal positions maintained up to and through the Victoria Conference on the
Constitution in June 1971. So far as health services are concerned,
Ottawa is now proceeding on the assumption that "deconditionalization" will not result in any lowering of standards in respect to those
services. 3 3 Thus the range and specificity of federal influence over
the Canadian welfare state has been steadily reduced.
C. InternationalEconomic Relations
At the end of the Second World War international economic relations
were seen in Canada almost entirely in terms of tariff and exchange
rate policy and of efforts to reconstruct a new world economic order
on liberal lines. Those responsibilities, it goes almost without saying,
involved Ottawa alone without significant participation by the provincial governments.
Because of the dependent nature of the Canadian economy, it is
inevitable that so far as the provinces are involved in significant
aspects of economic policy at all this involvement will extend to
international economic relations. In the 1960s there was a very rapid
development of the economic activities of the provinces abroad
consequent on the failure of national economic policy to secure
adequate conditions of employment and growth. One of the earliest
of such initiatives was the Ontario Trade Crusade begun in 1962. This
programme was centred on the need to provide 60,000 new jobs in
32. See the Rt. Hon. P. E. Trudeau, Federal-ProvincialGrants and the Spending
Power of Parliament (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1969).
33. Recent federal statements imply that federal fiscal transfers for health services
are conditional on the provinces continuing to adhere to the basic principles embodied in existing legislation. These principles according to the federal Minister of
Finance relate to "the universality and comprehensiveness of services; the accessibility of these services to the Canadian people; their public non-profit nature; and the
portability of coverage for individual Canadians moving from one province to
another". However, it appears unlikely that if a province should move away from
those principles the federal authorities could or would apply fiscal penalties.
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Ontario each year during the succeeding decade. This objective was
to be furthered by the stimulation of Ontario exports, particularly of
manufactured products, and the encouragement of the residents of the
province to buy Canadian goods of comparable prices rather than
imports. To this end, sales missions of Ontario manufacturers to the
United States and Europe were sponsored by the province, arrangements made to have foreign sales representatives act for small Ontario firms, several new trade offices opened outside Canada and an
aggressive campaign mounted to encourage consumers to buy Canadian goods. From the early 1960s onward it has become common for
provincial premiers and their cabinet colleagues to travel outside
Canada soliciting capital and markets and in June, 1972 Thomas
Levy reported that only Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island and
Manitoba had no trade offices abroad. 3 4 Ontario's involvement in
this respect was more extensive than that of the other provinces with
offices in Dusseldorf, Brussels, Vienna, London, Stockholm,
Tokyo, New York, Boston, Atlanta, Cleveland, Minneapolis and
Los Angeles. In the wake of President Nixon's new economic
policies announced in August 1971 both Alberta and Ontario showed
a disposition to establish some sort of missions in Washington to
safeguard their respective economic interests. Alberta has not followed through with this and would prefer, it seems, some sort of
institutionalized influence over national economic policies, particularly as these relate to the export of resources to the United States. So
far as Ontario is concerned, a Washington dispatch from Ross H.
Munro published in the Globe and Mail of August 12, 1972 reported
that the province had been dissuaded by the federal authorities from
setting up its own Washington office but that the two governments
were negotiating the conditions of an Ontario official working in the
Canadian Embassy.35

The new directions in Canadian foreign policy undertaken by
the Trudeau government from 1968 onward almost inevitably enhance the influence of the provinces in international relations. 3 6 In
34. The Role of the Provinces in ExternalAffairs: A Study in CanadianFederalism

(mimeo) 18. A paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Annual Conference
in Montreal, June, 1972.
35. It has been reported that at the Federal-Provincial Conference of May, 1973, the
Secretary of State for External Affairs offered the provinces the co-operation of
Canadian embassies abroad.
36. For this policy in general see Thorardson, Trudeauand ForeignPolicy (Oxford
University Press, Toronto); C. Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles: Foreign
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broad terms, there is in these new directions a relative de-emphasis on
international peace and stability as the first priority of Canadian
foreign policy and a disposition to orient Canada's international
activities around the furtherance of domestic objectives, particularly
but by no means exclusively those of an economic nature. But
increasingly, the provinces are involved in the formulation of such
objectives and thus play a larger role than before in international
relations. The relation between international and domestic objectives
is manifested as clearly as anywhere else in the circumstances surrounding Michelin Tire. Both Canada and the United States have
responded to unemployment and unsatisfactory rates of economic
growth by incentives to businesses producing for the export market.
Michelin was established in Canada with generous financial incentives from both the Nova Scotia and federal governments and in late
1972 its products entering the United States were subjected to a
surcharge by the American government. It is almost impossible to
visualize any effective policy for narrowing regional economic disparities in Canada which will not result in part of the product resulting
from such incentives being exported to the United States, and the
broader implications of the American action in respect to Michelin
are extremely hazardous for Canadian domestic economic policy.
From the late 1960s onward the penetration of Canada by
multinational corporations has become the major concern of
37
economic nationalists. The elements of the situation are well know.
In earlier periods of Canadian history borrowing from abroad was
overwhelmingly of the portfolio variety and did not confer on foreigners a continuing control over the Canadian economy. Now major
investment decisions of crucial importance to Canada are increasingly taken in the global interests of multinational corporations at a
time when the public authorities of the country have assumed responsibilities for narrowing interprovincial and intraprovincial dis-

Policy in the Trudeau Ena (Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1972) Chapter 4 and

D. C. Thomson and R. F. Swanson, CanadianForeignPolicy:Options andPerspectives (McGraw-Hill, Toronto, 1971) Chapter 9. Thomson and Swanson conclude at
p. 150, "If the economic growth of Canada is the primary objective [of the Trudeau
foreign policy] then much closer commercial and financial integration with the
United States is indicated, or at least, primacy for relations with the more developed
countries".
37. The analytical and polemical literature has become voluminous. See the useful
bibliography in G. Paquet (ed.), The Multinational Firm and the Nation-State
(Collier-Macmillan of Canada, Toronto, 1972) 167-182.
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parities, stimulating development in various locations and securing
appropriate levels of aggregate demand. Foreign direct investment
tends to be concentrated in those industries which are in the forefront
of technological innovation and thus crucial in shaping economic and
social development. There is the continuing problem of the extraterritorial application of United States legislation to American subsidiaries operating in Canada, and the even more difficult problem of
the sensitivity of those who control these corporations to influences
from the American government expressed in forms less explicit than
law. From broader perspectives, the increasing power of the multinational corporation challenges not only the autonomy of host countries
38
but the nation-state system itself.
The constitutional aspects of control over foreign investment in
Canada has only recently received serious consideration. In the most
extensive analysis of the matter yet made, E. James Arnett 9 has
concluded that under Section 91(25) of the BNA Act giving Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over "Naturalization and Aliens" the
federal authorities might validly establish a screening agency regulating foreign takeovers, new foreign investment, new licensing and
franchise arrangements by foreign firms and the activities of existing
foreign-controlled firms whether expanding their investment in
Canada or otherwise. Arnett argued, however, that certain current
proposals to roll back the extent of direct foreign investment in
Canada were enjoined by international law.
Despite what appear to be adequate federal powers in the constitutional sense to deal decisively with direct foreign investment,
both levels have been disposed to act as if this were a matter of joint
federal-provincial responsibility. This topic has been on the agenda
of several recent conferences of Prime Ministers and Premiers, including the most recent one of May 23-25, 1973. In Bill C-132 now
before the Parliament of Canada it is asserted that one of the five
factors to be taken into account by the government and the Foreign
Investment Review Agency in screening projected takeovers or new
foreign investment is the following: "(e) the compatibility of the
acquisition or establishment with national industrial and economic
policies, taking into consideration industrial and economic policy
38. R. Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The MultinationalSpread of U.S. Enterprises

(Basic Books, New York, 1971).
39. E. J.Arnett, "Canadian Regulation of Foreign Investment: The Legal Parameters" (1972), 50 Can. Bar. Rev. 213-247.
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objectives enunciated by the government or legislature of any province significantly affected by the acquisition or establishment."
Section 14 of the Bill qualifies the privileged nature of the information supplied to the Minister by or about businesses coming under the
terms of the legislation by providing in effect that he can consult with
the provinces on the basis of such information. The federal
government's expressed intention is to gain some experience with the
review process as it relates to takeovers and to consult with all the
provinces before proceeding to the registration and screening of
proposals by foreigners to set up new businesses in Canada. 4 0
The attitudes and policies of the provinces to direct foreign
investment and its regulation are in process of evolution. However,
even at this stage of development crucial differences in respect to this
matter have become evident: The Atlantic Provinces. The provinces
of the Atlantic region are so urgent about attracting capital that they
are likely to oppose any federal measures restricting foreign investment. In its brief on the proposed federal legislation to limit takeovers
to the House of Commons Committee on Finance on June 13, 1972
the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council said, "To be blunt, it
seems as if certain segments of opinion in central Canada, having
achieved the benefits of industrialization for themselves, now wish
the Atlantic Provinces to forego the industrialization they never had,
in the interests of maintaining an ill-defined Canadian economic
independence". 41 The A. P. E. C. statement went on to say, "We tend
not to make any distinction between investment that comes from
central Canada, the United States or other foreign countries, regarding it all, somehow, as foreign." 4 2
Quebec. The Quebec authorities on several occasions have
indicated their forthright opposition to restrictions on foreign investment which would have the effect of restricting such investment in
the province. In a major policy statement made by the Quebec
Minister of Finance, the Honourable Raymond Garneau, in March
1972 there was an expression of the government's hostility to the
extension of limitations on foreign ownership in such fields as broadcasting and banking to other industries and to the screening of foreign
40. At the Federal-Provincial Conference of May, 1973 the Premier of New Brunswick requested that the restrictions of the proposed legislation not be imposed in his
province.
41. Brief (mimeo).
42. Op. cit.
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investment by a federal agency as recommended in the Canadian
Forum version of the Gray Report. 43 Such screening, said the Minister, was likely to increase the economic disparities between Quebec
and Ontario as foreign investment was restricted without Canadian
capital made available to replace it. Mr. Garneau also expressed his
concern about the employment prospects of francophone graduates of
universities and colleges and the use of the French language in
industrial enterprises, to the general effect that his government had no
conviction that Canadian-controlled enterprises would be more sensitive to the particular needs of Quebec than foreign corporations. In
his address to the Economic Club of New York in January 1973
Premier Robert Bourassa spoke of the orientation of Quebec within
the "North American economic community" and asserted that,
"Although political sovereignities must be maintained, the existence
of a transnational economic community that transcends national and
provincial boundaries is. . . a reality that we must use to our greatest
44
advantage."
Ontario. Ontario under the Davis government has itself taken
several measures favouring Canadian over foreign enterprise and has
pressed for more aggressive federal leadership restricting foreign
control over the Canadian economy. In May, 1972 the government
announced its policy of limiting to Canadian firms its programme of
loans, half of which are written off if the provincial conditions are
met, made to businesses in designated slow-growth areas of Ontario.
Later in the year the provincial Parliament enacted legislation making
it mandatory that a majority of the directors of companies incorporated under Ontario law be Canadian. The province has already taken
action to prevent the publishing firm of McClelland and Stewart
coming under federal control and to forestall monopoly control by an
American firm in respect to the distribution of mass-market paperbacks and periodicals. It is likely that within the next year the
government will act on other recommendations of its Royal Commission on Publishing appointed in 1971.45
Manitoba, Saskatchewan andBritish Columbia. The leaders of
the governments of Manitoba and Saskatchewan, perhaps because of
their ideological predispositions, have expressed support for federal
43. "Strategie industrelle et investissement 6trangers", 27 mars, 1972 (mimeo).
44. Mimeo.
45. See Report Royal Commission on Book Publishing (Queen's Printer, Toronto,
1972).

572 The Dalhousie Law Journal

restrictions on foreign ownership. At the Federal-Provincial Conference of November, 1971, Premier Schreyer of Manitoba called for
steps by which "Canada might free itself as much as possible from
the restrictive ties which for decades have made our country subject
to undue influence from American political decisions and economic
fluctuations - steps which included "monitoring" multinational
enterprises to ensure that Canadian jobs would not be lost as these
corporations shifted production back to the United States to take
advantage of American subsidies and using American dollar reserves
of the Bank of Canada to buy Canadian control of major foreign
corporations. In a speech to the Canadian Club of Toronto on January
19, 1973 the Manitoba Premier recommended joint public-private
ventures in the development of Canadian natural resources and suggested a further mobilization of domestic capital, much now invested
in U.S. securities, for Canadian development. Premier Alan
Blakeney of Saskatchewan has also been critical of what he has
regarded as the unduly cautious approach of the Trudeau government
to foreign investment, and in particular of the Prime Minister's
statement of May, 1972 suggesting provincial action in respect to this
matter. I have not yet discovered statements of the N.D.P. government of British Columbia about foreign ownership, although its
ideological predispositions would be close to those of Manitoba and
Saskatchewan.
Alberta defines its interests on the foreign ownership issue
largely in terms of the exploitation and development of natural
resources and is likely to oppose any federal policies which are
perceived as likely to decrease investment in resource development.
The emergent strategy of the Lougheed government in respect to
resources is in the direction of a more coherent economic nationalism
than exists in any other province. Essentially, this strategy is toward
the continued development of these resources and their sale outside
the province at more favourable prices than have previously been
obtained along with the building up of an industrial structure based on
very cheap Alberta energy. The conditions imposed by the province
on the Syncrude Corporation in respect to the Athabasca tar sands
project attempt to protect the interests of Albertans as investors and
employees.
The provinces thus vary greatly in their attitudes to foreign
ownership and control and the Trudeau government is highly sensitive to their wishes. In an interview with the Toronto Star published
on May 20, 1972 the Prime Minister referred to the urgency of the
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provinces about economic development and the powers they had to
deal with foreign investment. As we have seen, Bill C-132 gives the
federal authorities discretion to take into account differing provincial
policies and needs.
In his trip to provincial capitals in the early summer of 1972 the
then federal Minister of Finance suggested a common information
centre for the foreign borrowing of the provinces. 46 Unlike many
other nations, Canada has no restrictions on the borrowing of its
constituent governments in foreign capital markets and in the months
immediately preceding Mr. Turner's visits such provincial borrowing had been particularly heavy and had thus contributed to raising
the value of the Canadian dollar and complicating the exchange rate
policies of the federal government. The provinces were understandably hostile to any suggestion of restrictions on their abilities to
borrow abroad as they chose and in particular that they should pay
more for domestic then foreign funds. In yet another dimension, Mr.
Turner's initiative revealed the dependence of effective national
economic policies on appropriate action by the provinces.
D. Conclusions and Consequences
The response of the provinces to the failure of the new national policy
to ensure adequate conditions of employment and growth was a new
set of social and economic policies to mitigate these deficiencies.
Provincial objectives are increasingly precise, increasingly comprehensive and increasingly sophisticated in their formulation and
implementation. There is here the emergence of the not completely
compatible economic nationalisms of the provinces and of Ottawa,
with little effective machinery for giving authoritative resolution to
the conflicts among the provinces or between national and provincial
interests. 4 7 The last part of this paper will discuss in a tentative way
the consequences of these clashes of nationalisms on two interrelated
aspects of Canadian policy (1) the narrowing of interprovincial
economic disparities, particularly as this is affected by the external
effects of provincial policies (2) the autonomy of Canadians in
economic matters, and in particular whether in Canadian-American
economic relations comprehensive rather than piecemeal Canadian
strategies are possible.
46. July 14, 1972.
47. See V. Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalismin the Seventies (McGraw-Hill
Ryerson, Toronto, 1972) Chapter 3, "Executive Federalism".
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We very badly need careful empirical studies of the impact of
the economic policies of particular provinces on Canadians and their
governments outside these provinces. What influence, for example,
have Ontario fiscal policies toward full employment and growth in
other parts of Canada? What are the consequences of provincial
differentials in the rates of taxation on individual incomes and in the
range and quality of public services for the decisions of Canadians to
change their province of residence? When Ontario moves more
decisively than does Quebec in the rationalization of local government in its metropolitan regions, what are the consequences for the
levels of economic activity in the two provinces? What impact are the
new Alberta industrial strategies likely to have on the distribution of
people and wealth within the prairie region? In the absence of such
analyses, only some of the more obvious externalities of provincial
policies will be noted briefly:
(i) the English-language publishing industry is overwhelmingly
concentrated in Ontario. What the government of that province has
done and will in the future do to implement the recommendations of
its Royal Commission on Book Publishing will have a direct effect on
Canadians outside Ontario. (ii) provinces, and sometimes local governments, give preferential treatment to their.own residents in respect
to government purchasing and public contracts. 4 8 With the magnitude of provincial and local expenditures on these matters we have
here significant barriers to business activity. To take an important and
recent example, a dispatch from Winnipeg by Roger Newman in the
Globe and Mail of April 10, 1973 reported that the Toronto Transportation Commission had decided to give about nine-tenths of a
$5.4-million contract for new buses to the General Motors London
plant, although Flyer Industries of Winnipeg - a company "74 per
cent owned by the Manitoba government - had tendered a significantly lower price. The dispatch suggested that the TTC decision was a
result of pressure from the Ontario Department of Transportation
whose Deputy Minister "told the TTC that preference should be
given to Ontario-made buses because of the province's serious unemployment." (iii) in a brief presented in September 1972 to the
Nova Scotia government Dean R. St. J.Macdonald and three of his
48. For an excellent analysis of the various devices of provincial protectionism see
A. Breton, Discriminatory Government Policies in Federal Countries (Canadian

Trade Committee, Private Planning Association of Canada, Montreal and Washington, 1967).
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colleagues of the Dalhousie Law School 49 argued that provincial
actions in respect to the development of natural resources had characteristically paid little attention to environmental consequences and
had made the United States the beneficiary of resources sold below
their "true long term economic value". Further, in such developments the provinces concerned had seldom taken into account the
interests of other provinces or the country at large. The Macdonald
brief documents this case with reference to the Columbia River
Treaty, the export of natural gas from Alberta and projected plans for
the export of Alberta water to the United States, the Nelson-Churchill
development in Manitoba and the James Bay project. (iv) in their
developmental policies, the provinces compete for investment capital
with foreign corporations the usual beneficiaries of such competition.
Philip Mathias has reported that prior to the establishment of three
Michelin Tire plants in Nova Scotia there was "fierce competition;;
between the Quebec and Nova Scotia governments and that "Undoubtedly, the price Manitoba paid for the Churchill Forest Industries
complex was affected by the need to attract it away from Quebec. "50
(v) in provincial policies to encourage development, it is plausible to
assume that growth may result in the less-favoured areas of prosperous provinces at the expense of depressed areas in other provinces. In
respect to the extra-provincial impact of Ontario incentive programmes T.N. Brewis has printed out the superior financial resources of
the province to provide industrial incentives and that". . . the poorer
regions of Ontario are not subject to such severe disadvantages as are
some elsewhere. Eastern Ontario is, for example, much less remote
from the large centres of population than is eastern Quebec or New-

foundland, and its prospects of undertaking profitable secondary
manufacturing are, as a result, generally much greater. As for federal
programs, they can be undermined by independent provincial
action. "51
In broad terms - and in the absence of conclusive evidence - it

seems reasonable to believe that provincial economic nationalisms
work in the direction of widening regional economic disparities. The
49. Economic Development with EnvironmentalSecurity, a brief submitted to the
Nova Scotia Representative of the Canadian Council of Resource and Environment
Ministers, at Halifax on September 27, 1972 by R. St. J.Macdonald, Q.C., Douglas
M. Johnston, Ian A. McDougall and Rowland J. H. Harrison (mimeo).
50. Forced Growth (James Lewis and Samuel, Toronto, 1971) 11.
51. Regional Economic Policies in Canada (Macmillan of Canada, Toronto,
1969) 214.
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extra-provincial effects of provincial policies obviously vary directly
with the population of the provinces and in this respect the "have"
jurisdictions of Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta rank first,
third and fourth respectively. So far as Quebec and Ontario are
concerned, aggressive provincial economic policies by the latter
seem likely to widen the material disparities between the two. The
federal government will no doubt retain its historical role in interregional equilization and in the past decade these national responsibilities have become more extensive and explicit than ever before.
Yet, as Brewis has pointed out, provincial activities in economic
development undertaken by the more favoured jurisdictions have the
capacity of undermining federal action. Further, the long run effect of
Ottawa relinquishing many of its former powers in social and
economic matters may be to discourage federal governments from
exacting tax burdens high enough to overcome intractable regional
disparities. The role of the national government as paymaster of the
provinces cannot be one for which federal politicians will have
enthusiasm.
To turn to the second aspect of Canadian economic policies,
Canadian-American relations in respect to these and other matters of
mutual concern appear to have been compartmentalized. The Gray
Report asserts ".

.

. both countries have tended to take a pragmatic

approach to bilateral problems. There is a constituency in each
country with an interest in any given issue, be it primarily a question
of foreign ownership, agriculture or other trade matter. These constituencies usually prefer to see the two governments deal with each
other in isolation and strike a balance in that area (a balance which
normally turns out to be regarded as positive for each though perhaps
not equal)". 52 K. J. Holsti in analyzing the Canadian-American
"diplomatic culture" has come to similar conclusions. 53 There is he
claims ".

.

. the relative absence of 'spillover' of conflict from one

issue area into another". Thus "The extensive formal and informal
communications network, bureaucratic specialization, and the sheer
number of people working on Canadian-American relations help to
reduce the probability that a conflict in one area will have much
impact in other areas. If an issue is critical enough to reach cabinet
level, disagreements between the two countries may have a cumula52. Foreign Direct Investment in Canada (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1972) 315.
53. "Canada and the United States" in S. L. Spiegel and K. W. Waltz (eds.),
Conflictin WorldPolitics (Winthrop Publishers, Cambridge, Mass., 1971)375-396.
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tive effect, but a lower levels, where the majority of problems are
studied and resolved, the issues remain mostly isolated."54 It was
perhaps the specificity and pervasiveness of Canadian-American
relations which caused the Trudeau government to avoid devoting an
explicit analysis to them in the foreign policy review whose results
were published in 1970.
There is now a considerable body of Canadian opinion which
asserts that the country's interests can only be served by a more
integrated and comprehensive approach to its external economic
environment. In terms of domestic policy, it is argued, the "key
sector" approach by which from time to time particular kinds of
economic activity are subjected to safeguards ensuring Canadian
ownership and control is no longer by itself adequate. 55 Thus some
kind of Canadian industrial strategy is required, a strategy which in
most of its formulations contains prescriptions both for limiting
foreign direct investment and for more coherent public policies than
now exist for shaping the Canadian economy. 56 The industrial
strategies which have been recommended vary in form and emphasis.
However, almost none of them come to grips in any coherent way
with the circumstances of divided jurisdiction over economic matters
57
between the federal and provincial governments.
Apart from the domestic side of industrial strategy, it has also
been recommended that Canadian economic strategies with the United States government be conducted in a more integrated way. The
Report of the Standing Committee of the House of Commons on
External Affairs and Defence recommended in 1970 that ".

.

. the

Government should review the problem of coordinating all Canadian
governmental dealings with the United States to provide for a unified
and coherent policy with the United States."'158 In his paper presented
54. Ibid., at 394. Holsti also points out the rarity of spillovers "in a vertical sense"
ie. "If the relations of the Prime Minister and the President are not cordial, there are
few appreciable results on dealings at lower levels". ibid., at 395.
55. For example, Direct Foreign Investment in Canada, op. cit., chapter 26.
56. See for example Direct ForeignInvestment in Canada, op. cit.; A. W. Carr,
Recovering CanadianNationhood (Canada Publishing Company, Ottawa, 1971);

the symposium in the February 1972 issue of the CanadianForum on "An Industrial
Strategy for Canada", and A Science Policy for Canada, Report of the Senate
Special Committee on Science Policy (Information Canada, Ottawa, 1972) Vol. 2,
especially 534-538, "A New National Policy".
57. For example, in the CanadianForum symposium op. cit. there are in the eleven
articles, mostly by professional economists, only three references to the federalprovincial dimension and those references are all incidental.
58. 33: 138.
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on March 31, 1973 to a conference of the Association for Canadian
Studies in the United States Senator Maurice Lamontagne elucidated
the case for a comprehensive economic strategy toward the United
States in more detail than had the Wahn Committee. 5 9 The Canadian
economy lacks an indigenous capacity for innovation and this must
be remedied by a coherent science policy. The crucial manufacturing
sector is weak and economic development has up until now been
sustained largely through the exploitation by foreign capital of our
natural resources. In the new circumstances Canadian and American
economic strategies are in direct conflict. Canada requires ".

.

.a

dynamic technological strategy based on the launching of a major
industrial conversion and innovation operation aimed primarily at
making the manufacturing sector more competitive on the world
markets and resources industries more conscious of long-term interests and requirements." On the other hand, "The American government appears eager to secure greater access to our resources and to
give, at the same time, to U.S. manufacturing interests more protection at home and more incentives to sell abroad." Senator Lamontagne argued that although the Americans "would prefer to deal with
Canada about specific economic problems in a piecemeal basis" only
a package deal can make sense from a Canadian point of view.
The recommendations of the Wahn Committee and Senator
Lamontagne appear to overlook the federal-provincial dimension of
the making of economic policy in Canada. Obviously any "package
deal" between Canada and the United States would contain an
agreement about the development of energy resources and access to
these resources. The possibility of federal-provincial agreement on
this matter seems remote. In a thoughtful editorial on January 12,
1973 the Globe and Mail committed on the expressed desire of
Senator Henry Jackson of Washington and Secretary of the Interior
Rogers Morton for a continental energy policy, "It takes two to make
a deal

. . .

there is no Canadian 'one' to make a deal. Canada is so

fractured among federal and provincial Governments on resource
policy that it is more like a rabble than a unit."
A model of coherent external strategies is that of Quebec
policies during the 1960s, particularly as these policies were formulated and implemented through the Department of Federal-Provincial

59. Scientific Research and Canadian Economic Viability (xerox).
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Affairs, later the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs. 6 0 As
analyzed retrospectively by the Department's Deputy Minister,
Quebec's policies toward the federal government during this period
were carried out in terms of a zero-sum game with the province's
gains defined as the success of its efforts to safeguard and extend its
range of autonomy. 6 ' If this Quebec model were applied to Canada's
relations with the United States it would be necessary for the new
Department of American Affairs to be able, in the interests of broad
Canadian goals, to control not only the agencies of the federal
government concerned with particular aspects of economic policy but
the provinces as well. This latter at least seems improbable.
In conclusion, the weakening of the new national policy from
the late 1950s onward has led to conflicting federal and provincial
economic national nationalisms. William C. Hood in 1964 elucidated
the three "distinguishing economic characteristics of a nation" in
these terms. "The component parts are bound in what may best be
described as a customs union, having no internal barriers to trade and
a common external commercial policy . . . [The nation] has a common monetary system and policy, adequately supported by other
policies . ..there exist a national dedication to the principle that
common minimum standards of welfare and public services shall
exist throughout the country . . .",62 By even the most tolerant
application of Hood's criteria Canada can scarcely be called in an
economic sense a nation.
60. C. Morin, "The Department of Intergovernmental Affairs" in Quebec in the
Canada of Tomorrow (Ontario Advisory Committee on Confederation, Toronto,
1967) 5-1.
61. C. Morin, Le Pouvoir Quebecoia .... in negotiation (les editions du boreal
express, Montreal, 1972).
62. "Economic Policy in our Federal State" in P. A. Creapeau and C. B. MacPherson (eds), The Future ofFederalism in Canada (University of Toronto Press and Les

Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1965) 58-60.
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